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ABSTRACT 
 
Through comparative analysis of United States, English, German and European Court 
of Human Rights jurisprudence, this article considers the viability of relying 
exclusively on either speaker or audience interests to underpin a free speech right 
within the context of anonymous and pseudonymous social media and online speech. 
It argues that this approach, which has hitherto been applied in these jurisdictions, can 
lead to a ‘double-edged sword’: on the one side, pursuant to audience interests, people 
may be dissuaded from participating in the exchange of information and ideas, because 
their anonymity or pseudonymity is not protected; on the other side, a constitutionally 
protected right to free speech based entirely on speaker interests could inadvertently 
protect unwanted and damaging speech.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been recognised, both by legal scholars, and within the context of legal practice, 
that social media, and the Internet generally, facilitates anonymous and pseudonymous 
expression.1 This article begins, at section 1.1, by briefly introducing the concepts of 
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1 From legal scholarship see generally: S. Levmore, ‘The Internet’s Anonymity Problem’ in S. Levmore 
and M. Nussbaum (eds), The Offensive Internet (Harvard University Press, 2010); J. Bartlett, The Dark 
Net Inside the Digital Underworld (Random House, 2014), ch. 2; E. Barendt, Anonymous Speech (Hart 
Publishing, 2016), ch. 6; B. Arnold, ‘Has social media really shifted the line between personal and private 
forever? https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2016/10/13/has-social-media-really-shifted-the-line-between-
personal-and-private-forever-bruce-baer-arnold/ accessed 13th October 2016. In relation to UK legal 
practice, see the Director of Public Prosecution’s comments relating to Crown Prosecution Service 
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speaker and audience interests. It does this by setting out, in broad terms, the arguments 
that are analysed in detail throughout this article in favour and against these conflicting 
interests. Section 2 sets out how free speech is treated in England, the United States 
(US) and by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It establishes that English2 
jurisprudence has, traditionally, treated free speech, and by extension anonymous and 
pseudonymous expression, not as a right, but rather a liberty, in that it exists only where 
its exercise is not restricted by law; a position predominantly based on audience 
interests, rather than that of the speaker. It argues that this position has evolved to an 
extent. Consequently, a right to free speech and, therefore anonymous and 
pseudonymous expression, does, in fact, exist as part of the free speech guarantee. 
However, this right is not absolute and, as a result, is only subject to a level of 
protection. This view is then compared with the polarised position of the US (and to an 
extent, Germany) in which exists a clearly recognised speaker interests-orientated right 
to anonymous and pseudonymous speech, which is subject to constitutional protection. 
What is apparent from the Strasbourg case law is that protection afforded for 
anonymous and pseudonymous expression falls short of an absolute right. 
Consequently, at present at least, it seems to sit, rather opaquely, somewhere between 
the two sides. This feeds in to section 3, which examines the problems that are 
symptomatic of relying exclusively on either speaker or audience interests at the 
expense of the other. It argues that, particularly in the modern context of online and 
social media expression, this bifurcated approach, which has hitherto been applied in 
England, Europe and the US, can lead to a ‘double-edged sword’: on the one side, 
pursuant to audience interests, people may be dissuaded from participating in the 
exchange of information and ideas, because their anonymity or pseudonymity is not 
protected; on the other side, a constitutionally protected right to free speech based 
entirely on speaker interests could inadvertently protect unwanted and damaging 
speech. This argument is considered through the lens of three specific harms3 that can 
emanate from anonymous and pseudonymous speech which are, arguably, better 
regulated by an audience-orientated approach. 
																																																								
guidelines on prosecuting online crimes, including trolling: ‘Internet trolls targeted with new legal 
guidelines’, 10th October 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37601431 accessed 12th October 2016. 
2 References to ‘English law’ means the law and jurisprudence of England and Wales. 
3 The three harms considered are the: (i) absence of ‘responsible’ intermediaries; (ii) proliferation of 
‘fake news’; (iii) fact that victims of, for instance, cyber-bullying, hate crime and defamation are not 
able to identify the origin of the communication. 
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1.1 Introducing the concepts of speaker and audience interests 
 
As set out above, this article considers the contrasting positions of English, European 
and US jurisprudence in respect of reliance on speaker or audience interests. What these 
concepts mean in practice will depend on whether they are, in any given context, 
underpinned by free speech or privacy rationales. By way of introducing these concepts, 
the following paragraph sets out the broad arguments in favour and against the 
competing interests. These arguments are applied and analysed in-depth throughout the 
article. 
 
 The privacy rationale for anonymity and pseudonymity underpins the right to 
keep certain information secret, including the speaker’s identity.4 From a freedom of 
expression rationale perspective protecting the speaker interests, by preserving their 
anonymity or pseudonymity, will encourage them, and others, to speak more freely, 
and therefore will facilitate the dissemination of more information; if they are permitted 
to communicate anonymously or pseudonymously they do not need to fear harassment 
or prosecution. 5  So far as audience interests are concerned, there are conflicting 
arguments. On the one hand, it can be said that the anonymity or pseudonymity of the 
speaker can benefit the audience, in so far as it promotes free speech, as an anonymous 
or pseudonymous speaker is more inclined to impart information to the audience for 
the reasons set out above. On the other hand, the audience interest will usually favour 
transparency, for the following reasons: (i) knowing the identity of the speaker enables 
the audience to evaluate the speaker’s veracity; (ii) if the speaker’s identity is known 
they are more likely to express themselves responsibly, and less likely to engage in 
harmful, offensive, irresponsible and damaging speech; (iii) remedial action and/or 
prosecution with respect to damaging, offensive and harmful speech is easier to 
facilitate if the identity of the speaker is known.6 
																																																								
4 See: Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, 22nd May 2015, A/HRC/29/32, [16]ff; J. Oster, 
European and International Media Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 47; The privacy rationale 
for anonymity and pseudonymity is considered in light of Eady J’s judgment in Author of a Blog v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [2009] EMLR 22 at section 2.1 below. 
5 ibid (Oster); R. Arnold and M. Rajan, ‘Do authors and performers have a legal right to pseudonymity’ 
Journal of Media Law (2017), DOI: 10.1080/17577632.2017.1347082, 10. 
6 ibid. (Arnold and Rajan),10. 
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2. ANONYMOUS AND PSEUDONYMOUS SPEECH: A POLARISATION OF 
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Through recourse to both statute and case law relating, where possible, to online and 
social media expression, this section considers how the respective law has been applied 
to anonymous speech. In doing so, it looks at jurisdictions that have opposing views as 
to the extent to which such expression is protected.  
 
2.1 The view from England and the European Court of Human Rights: a 
qualified right to anonymous and pseudonymous speech 
 
In his book Anonymous Speech,7 Barendt provides a detailed history of anonymous and 
pseudonymous speech in England. What is clear is that, despite this established 
tradition, and unlike the US, where a strong constitutional right to anonymous speech 
has emerged, in England an absolute right is not recognised. 8  This position derives 
from how freedom of expression has historically been treated under English law: as a 
bare or residual liberty rather than a right, existing only where the law does not restrict 
its exercise.9 Thus, traditionally at least, the ‘freedom lives…in the gaps of the criminal 
and civil law’. 10  However, as illustrated by cases such as Brutus v Cozens 11  and 
Redmond-Bate v DPP,12 a stronger principle of free speech has been applied by the 
courts to narrowly interpret legislation so that the respective statute’s interference with 
freedom of expression is minimised. Equally, a common law right to free speech has 
																																																								
7 Barendt, above n 1, ch. 2. 
8 For the US and German position, see section 2.1.1 below. This view on the positions of English and 
US law is supported by Arnold and Rajan above n 5, 9. 
9 Barendt above n 1, 81 and 89. Barendt provides examples of laws such as obscenity, libel and contempt 
of court, which have restricted the application of freedom of expression. 
10 ibid. 
11 [1973] AC 854. The House of Lords held that the word ‘insulting’, pursuant to section 5 of the Public 
Order Act 1936, should not be interpreted to penalise the use of offensive language during an anti-
apartheid demonstration at Wimbledon. 
12 [2000] HRLR 249; (1999) 7 BHRC 375; [1999] Crim LR 998. The case related to three women 
Christian fundamentalists who were preaching from the steps of Wakefield Cathedral. Fearing a breach 
of the peace amongst the crowd, a police officer asked the women to stop, and subsequently arrested 
them for willfully obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty contrary to section 89(2) of the 
Police Act 1996. The Court of Appeal held that the police had no right to stop citizens engaging in lawful 
conduct, unless there were grounds to fear that it would, by interfering with the rights or liberties of 
others, provoke violence which in those circumstances might not be unreasonable. Accordingly, the 
preachers were entitled to say things which members of their audience may find irritating or 
controversial, but they did not threaten or provoke violence. As a result, the police officer was not acting 
in the execution of his duty when he told them to stop. 
		 5
been established by jurisprudence relating to, for instance, the creation and 
development of defences of fair comment and public interest privilege to libel actions.13 
The protection afforded to freedom of expression was augmented further by the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), including the 
Article 10 right to freedom of expression, into English law by the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA 1998). Pursuant to section 6(1) HRA 1998, the courts must take account of 
the right when developing the common law. Similarly, section 3 imposes an obligation 
on the judiciary to interpret legislation in conformity with Article 10. As a result, it is 
no longer correct to regard free speech as a mere residual liberty.14 
 
 How do these developments relate to online speech and, in particular, social 
media expression, in the context of anonymous and pseudonymous communication? 
As set out above, it is submitted that, as is the case with the print and broadcast media, 
there is, under English law, a right, albeit not an absolute one, to communicate 
anonymously and pseudonymously online and via social media.15 However, this type 
of communication is subject to the same legal restrictions that can be applied to the 
traditional media, such as public order laws, laws relating to hate speech, obscenity 
laws, the Protection from Harassment Act 199716 and, more specifically, section 127 
of the Communications Act 200317 and sections 3218 and 3319 of the Criminal Justice 
																																																								
13 For example see: Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743; Spiller v Joseph [2011] 1 
AC 852, [107]-[108]; Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127; Jameel v Wall Street Journal 
Europe [2007] 1 AC 359. 
14 Barendt above n 1, 90. 
15 The existence of such a right is demonstrated by section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which 
provides that a court cannot compel a person to disclose, nor is a person guilty of contempt of court for 
refusing to disclose, the source of information contained within a document for which that person is 
responsible, unless the court is satisfied that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national 
security or for the prevention of disorder or crime. 
16 J. Rowbottom, ‘To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech’ (2012) 71 
Cambridge Law Journal 355, 357-365. 
17 This provision makes it an offence to send through a public electronic communications network a 
message which is ‘grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character’. For analysis of 
this provision see: P. Coe, ‘The social media paradox: an intersection with freedom of expression and 
the criminal law’, Information & Communications Technology Law (2015) Vol. 24, Issue 1, 16-40, 31-
35. See also: DPP v Woods Unrep. October 2012 (MC); Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157. 
18 This amended the offence of sending a letter, electronic communication or article of any description 
which conveys a threat or abuse, pursuant to section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, to a 
triable either way offence. The amendment was made, partly, to tackle concerns over an increase in 
‘cyber-bullying’. 
19  This provision has made ‘revenge porn’ a specific triable either way offence. It is defined as 
‘[d]isclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress’, and covers the sharing 
of images, both online and offline. This means that images posted over the Internet and via social media, 
as well as those distributed by text message, email or in hard copy are captured.  
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and Courts Act 2015. In the context of civil liability and, in particular, the protection of 
reputation, section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides website operators with a 
defence to defamation actions where an operator did not, itself, post the allegedly 
defamatory imputation on the website. The defence will operate so long as the claimant 
can identify the speaker who posted the imputation, or the operator takes steps to 
provide the claimant with the speaker’s full name and address or, if the speaker prefers, 
to remove the statement from the website.20 Consequently, the only way anonymous 
speakers will be able to keep their defamatory statements on websites is with the 
website operator’s assistance. This is unlikely as the operator is then, by default, 
exposed to liability. Thus, these provisions, relating to both criminal and civil liability, 
appear to suggest that online anonymous communication is, to an extent, discouraged, 
and clearly have the potential to limit freedom of anonymous and pseudonymous 
speech. Therefore, they could be subject to challenge. However, it is likely that this 
would be met with strong arguments to the contrary, as the courts are unlikely to favour 
submissions that they should not be applied when they operate to protect victims of, for 
instance, cyber-bullying, revenge porn and defamatory attacks.21   
 
The existence or otherwise of a right to anonymity was considered in Author of 
a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd22 as an element of personal privacy, as opposed to an 
aspect of the right to freedom of expression. The case concerned a blog, known as 
‘Night Jack’.23 The author of the blog used it as a platform for discussing his work as a 
serving police officer. Within these discussions he was extremely critical of 
government ministers and police operations. Indeed, in his judgment, Eady J was of the 
opinion that much of what the claimant published could be characterised as ‘political 
speech’.24 The Times wanted to reveal the blogger’s identity;25 consequently he applied 
																																																								
20 For detailed analysis of this provision see: J. Price QC and F. McMahon (eds), Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Defamation Act 2013, (Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 6.  
21 Barendt above n 1, 90. 
22 [2009] EMLR 22. 
23 Which, incidentally, had been awarded the Orwell Prize for citizen journalism in 2009. 
24 [2009] EMLR 22, [24]. 
25 Interestingly, this case dealt with rather unique circumstances: The Times journalist had identified the 
claimant by deduction not, as was accepted by counsel for the claimant, by breach of confidence. 
Therefore, the matter related to whether an enforceable right to maintain anonymity existed in the 
situation where another person has been able to deduce the identity in question. Eady J recognised that 
bloggers generally may want to conceal their identity. However, in relying on Mahmood v Galloway 
[2006] EMLR 26, Eady J stated that it is a ‘significantly further step to argue, if others are able to deduce 
their [the claimant’s] identity, that they [The Times] should be retrained by law from revealing it.’ Thus, 
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to the court for an interim injunction to restrain the newspaper from publishing any 
information that could lead to his identification as the person responsible for the blog. 
Hugh Tomlinson QC, on behalf of the claimant, argued in terms of his right to privacy. 
However, it is arguable that, additionally, some of the arguments were underpinned by 
the free speech rationale. Both the privacy and free speech arguments were 
predominantly based on the interests of the speaker. He advanced the argument that the 
claimant, and other bloggers, would be ‘horrified’ if their anonymity could not be 
protected,26 a proposition clearly based on the privacy rationale that anonymity [and 
pseudonymity] allows speakers to keep certain information secret, including their 
identity.27 He submitted, firstly, as a general proposition, that ‘there is a public interest 
in preserving the anonymity of bloggers.’28 It is submitted that this argument is founded 
on the free speech rationale, and is based, foremost, on speaker interests, as preserving 
the anonymity of bloggers enables them to exercise their right to impart information 
and ideas, as guaranteed by Article 10(1) ECHR (and that, conversely, revealing their 
identity would restrict their right to do this).29 Secondly, he suggested that there was no 
public interest in the disclosure of the claimant’s identity, as the publication of such 
information would make no contribution to a debate of general interest.30 In giving 
judgment for the defendant, Eady J did not expressly accept or reject any arguments 
based on the free speech rationale by the claimant. However, he rejected the claimant’s 
application, and their privacy arguments, on the ground that ‘blogging is essentially a 
public rather than a private activity,’31 consequently the claimant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.32 He went on to state that even if this requirement had been met, 
the public interest in revealing that a police officer was expressing strong criticism of 
the police and political figures outweighed his right to privacy33 and that revealing his 
																																																								
potentially at least, the situation may be different if the identity of the speaker could not be deduced but, 
for example a newspaper, wanted to disclose it. ibid. [3], [9] and [10]. 
26 ibid. [4]. 
27 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, 22nd May 2015, A/HRC/29/32, [16]ff; Oster above 
n 4, 47. 
28[2006] EMLR 26. [5] 
29 ibid. [18]. Of course, there is the secondary argument that preserving the anonymity of bloggers 
protects the audience interest in receiving information of public interest, as bloggers may be dissuaded 
from doing so should their identity be compromised. 
30 ibid. [22].  
31 ibid. [11], [29] and [33]. 
32 This is a threshold requirement for claimant’s pleading misuse of private information. 
33 [2009] EMLR 22, [21]-[23] and [33]. 
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identity enabled readers to assess his veracity.34 Thus, the judgment seems, largely, to 
ignore any speaker-orientated arguments based on the free speech rationale advanced 
on behalf of the claimant and, rather, based on the interests of the audience, disagrees 
with counsel’s second argument.  
 
A discrete area of English law where the privacy rationale has successfully been 
applied to protect anonymity relates to Norwich Pharmacal orders.35 For instance, in 
Totalise plc v The Motley Fool Ltd36 the claimant had successfully applied for such an 
order for the disclosure by Motley Fool of the identity of a third party who had posted, 
pseudonymously, defamatory comments of the claimant on a bulletin board. In giving 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Aldous J said that in such cases ‘the court must 
be careful not to make an order which unjustifiably invades the right of the individual 
to respect for his private life’ and that there was ‘nothing in Article 10’ which supported 
the argument that ‘it protects the named but not the anonymous’ and that ‘there are 
many situations in which…the protection of a person’s identity from disclosure may be 
legitimate.’ 37  Consequently, as observed by Arnold and Rajan, in the context of 
pseudonymity specifically: ‘[c]onsistently with [Totalise] there have been cases…in 
which Norwich Pharmacal orders for the disclosure of the identities of pseudonymous 
persons posting on chatrooms and websites have been refused on the ground that the 
wrongs alleged against them did not justify invading their private lives.’38 
 
Notwithstanding the jurisprudence relating to Norwich Pharmacal orders, Eady 
J’s judgment in Author of a Blog clearly suggests, and is indicative of the fact, that 
freedom of anonymous and pseudonymous speech enjoys very limited protection in 
modern English law. This case, along with Reno v American Civil Liberties Union,39 
(see section 2.1.1 below) are considered in more detail in section 3, as they animate the 
																																																								
34 ibid. 21. See analysis and criticisms of this point at section 3.1 below. 
35 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133: Under the Norwich 
Pharmacal procedure the court can order that an individual or entity, who is not a party to the court 
proceedings, but who is innocently or not, mixed up in the wrongdoing, to assist a party to the 
proceedings, by providing specified information or documents in respect of the proceedings. 
36 [2001] EWCA Civ 1897; [2002] 1 WLR 1233. 
37 ibid. [25]. 
38 Arnold and Rajan above n 5, 14. The cases cited by Arnold and Rajan include: Sheffield Wednesday 
Football Club Ltd v Hargreaves [2007] EWHC 2375 (QB) and Clift v Clarke [2011] EWHC 1164 (QB); 
[2013} Info TLR 13. See also: M. Daly, ‘ Is There an Entitlement to Anonymity? A European and 
International Analysis’ [2013] EIPR 198. 
39 521 US 844 (1997). 
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problems associated with relying exclusively on either audience or speaker interests 
respectively. 
  
 Under section 2(1) HRA 1998 an English court must take account of decisions 
of the ECtHR, although any such ruling does not bind it. As a result, anonymous and 
pseudonymous expression could be subject to stronger protection under English law if 
there were a clear indication of the existence of a free speech anonymity right from the 
Strasbourg Court. However, the Court has, to date, not been required to consider the 
extent to which a limit imposed on anonymous speech would render any such limit as 
incompatible with Article 10 ECHR. If such an issue were to be brought before the 
Court, it is likely that a state would robustly argue for restrictions to be placed on 
anonymous expression, for example, on the basis that it needs to protect the right to 
respect for private life pursuant to Article 8 ECHR, including the right to reputation, 
which can require, as discussed above in relation to section 5 of the Defamation Act 
2013, disclosure of the speaker’s personal details. Additionally, far from providing 
clarity on the existence, or otherwise, of a right to freedom of anonymous speech 
conveyed online and via social media, ECtHR jurisprudence on the matter has been 
equivocal. In KU v Finland40 the Court held that any guarantee of privacy and freedom 
of expression rights for an individual placing an anonymous advertisement is not 
absolute, and must accord precedence to other rights and interests, such as the 
prevention of crime and the protection of rights of others. However, although the 
ECtHR decision in Delfi AS v Estonia41 seems to be based explicitly on audience 
interests in free speech,42  the Court afforded online anonymous communication a 
greater level of importance. Delfi, an Internet news portal service, had been required 
by the Estonian courts to compensate the victim of threatening and defamatory 
comments which had been posted on its service, even though it operated a ‘notice-and-
take-down’ procedure when readers complained of these statements. The issue before 
the Court was whether or not there had been an infringement of the freedom of 
expression of the owner of Delfi. The Grand Chamber of the Court held that the 
Estonian Supreme Court’s ruling was compatible with the ECHR, stating that ‘[i]t is 
																																																								
40 Application no. 2872/02 (2009) 48 EHRR 52. 
41 Application no. 64569/09, Decision of the First Section Chamber of the Court, 10th October 2013, 
(2014) 58 EHRR 29, upheld by the Grand Chamber of the Court in a Decision of 16th June 2015, [2015] 
EMLR 26. 
42 Speaker and audience interests are discussed below in section 3. 
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mindful…of the interest of Internet users in not disclosing their identity.’43 According 
to the Court, anonymity ‘is capable of promoting the free flow of ideas and information 
in an important manner, including, notably, on the Internet.’44 Consequently, it rejected 
Delfi’s argument that victims of defamatory statements must bring defamation 
proceedings against the authors of comments after their identity had been established.45 
Other Council of Europe institutions have emphasised the importance of online 
anonymous communication. For instance, in Delfi the Court considered a Declaration 
of the Council of Ministers on freedom of communication on the Internet.46 Principle 7 
of the Declaration recognises that ‘to ensure protection against online surveillance and 
to enhance the free expression of information and ideas, member states should respect 
the will of users of the internet not to disclose their identity.’47 Additionally, an earlier 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers had suggested recognition of 
anonymity in the context of Internet communications as an aspect of personal privacy 
protection.48 Although these provisions, and the Strasbourg Court’s decision in Delfi, 
do not, as yet, establish an absolute right to anonymous and pseudonymous speech, it 
is submitted that such explicit recognition of the importance of anonymous and 
pseudonymous expression from the ECtHR and Council of Europe institutions suggests 
that, in the correct circumstances, such a right could be brought into existence. As will 
be seen in the following section, the US position (and, to an extent, the position in 
Germany) is markedly different. In the US, a constitutional right to anonymous speech, 
both generally, and online, has been consistently held to exist and has been protected.  
 
 
 
 
2.1.1 The German and US position: the Spickmich case and McIntyre v Ohio 
Elections Commission – an absolute right to anonymous and pseudonymous 
speech? 
 
																																																								
43 [2015] EMLR 26, [147]. 
44 ibid. [147]. 
45 ibid [151]. 
46 ibid. [44]. 
47 Declaration of Council of Ministers adopted on 28th May 2003, Principle 7 (Anonymity). 
48 Recommendation No R (99) 5 of the Committee of Ministers, For the Protection of Privacy on the 
Internet, 23rd February 1999, Guidelines 3 and 4. 
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Unlike the ECtHR’s equivocal stance on anonymous and pseudonymous online 
expression, German jurisprudence is clearer as to the courts’ adopted position. This is 
illustrated by the Spickmich case,49 which concerned a teacher who argued that her 
name, the details of her school and, specifically, anonymous assessments of her 
teaching by pupils should be removed from www.spickmich.de, a portal for community 
schools, which was accessible via registration, by providing the user’s name, email 
address and school details. The issue before the German courts concerned conflicting 
rights. On the one hand, the teacher submitted that the storage and publication of the 
information contravened her right to informational self-determination – in that she 
should be able to determine what, if any, information should be made available to those 
with access to the portal. This privacy right is subject to robust protection under German 
law.50 However, on the other hand, the argument was advanced that, based on the right 
to freedom of expression, students should be able to assess the teaching qualities of 
their teachers anonymously. The Federal Supreme Court,51 in upholding the rulings of 
the lower court, dismissed the teacher’s complaint. The Court’s decision was founded 
on three key points: firstly, anonymity is an inherent aspect of the use of the Internet;52 
secondly, in any event, section 13 VI of the Telemedia Act 2007 protects anonymity 
and pseudonymity. Pursuant to this provision service providers must, as far as is 
technically possible and reasonable, allow the anonymous or pseudonymous use of their 
services; and, finally, as a matter of principle, an obligation to identify an individual 
with the expression of a particular view would, both generally, and in the specific 
context of this case, lead to self-censorship from fear of the negative consequences of 
identification.53 The Court held that the imposition of such an obligation would be 
																																																								
49 Decision of 23rd June 2009, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2009, 2888. 
50 The origins of the right to informational self-determination date back to 1983, when the German 
Federal Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Revised Census Act that 
had been adopted unanimously by the German Federal Parliament, but were challenged by diverse 
associations before the Constitutional Court. BVerfGE 65, 1 – Volkzählung Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 
15th December 1983 auf die mündliche Verhandlung vom 18th and 19th October 1983 – 1 BvR 209, 269, 
362, 420, 440, 484/83 in den Verfahren über die Verfassungsbeschwerden; See generally: A. Rouvroy 
and Y. Poullet, ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: 
Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’ in S. Gutwith et al (eds), Reinventing Data 
Protection? (Springer, 2009). 
51 The Bundesgerichtshof. 
52 Indeed, this had been recognised in an earlier decision of the Court, which held that contributors to a 
discussion forum must accept the risk of personal attack from pseudonymous participants: Decision of 
27th March 2007, NJW 2007, 2558. 
53 Decision of 23rd June 2009, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2009, [38]. 
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incompatible with article 5.1 of the German Basic Law.54 At this juncture it is worth 
considering that the Court’s claim that ‘anonymity is an inherent aspect of the use of 
Internet’ could be perceived as a naturalistic fallacy, and open to the rejoinder that just 
because anonymity is largely a part of cyber-culture, does not force the conclusion that 
it ought to be that way. Instead, it is submitted that the judgment is more subtle and 
nuanced, as it does not impose a de facto ‘cyber-right’ to anonymity, but rather ‘reveals 
the strong attachment’ of German law to the freedom to use online communications 
anonymously,55 in that it demonstrates that freedom of such speech takes precedence 
over the important countervailing right to informational self-determination as an 
element of personal privacy. Thus, the reasoning of the Court is clearly indicative of a 
speaker interest-orientated approach. It is less equivocal than the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, and demonstrates stronger support for speaker interests than is present in 
England. For instance, although the context of the cases are different, in Author of a 
Blog, in Eady J’s judgment, the speaker’s identity was required to enable the audience 
to assess the value of his publications. In other words, the public interest dimension of 
the speaker’s claim was impaired by anonymity.56  To the contrary, the blogger’s 
argument for anonymity was based on the fact that it allowed him (and other bloggers) 
to disseminate important information, as a whistleblower, without fear of reprisals from 
his employers or the state.57 This argument is, fundamentally, the same as the Court’s 
reasoning for dismissing the teacher’s complaint in Spickmich as, in the Court’s view, 
anonymity allowed the speaker (the children) to advance their honest view without fear 
of retribution. However, unlike the US position examined below, the Spickmich 
decision is not solely based on the interests of the speaker. Rather, it is submitted that 
the judgment also exhibits elements of an audience interest approach. This is on the 
basis that the free dissemination of information about the teacher enabled those with 
access to the portal to make an informed decision as to the performance of the teacher 
and the school. 
 
In the US there has been even stronger jurisprudential support for freedom of 
anonymous and pseudonymous online expression that is, therefore, diametrically 
																																																								
54 The Court also found that the portal facilitated the right of the students, parents and teachers to 
receive information, which is also protected by article 5.1: ibid. [40]. 
55 Barendt above n 1, 153. 
56 [2009] EMLR 22, [21]-[23]. 
57 ibid. [5]. 
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opposed to the English position. The Supreme Court case of McIntyre v Ohio Elections 
Commission58 concerned Margaret McIntyre, who had distributed leaflets at public 
meetings at an Ohio school. The leaflets expressed opposition to a proposed school tax 
levy. McIntyre had produced the leaflets at home on her own computer. In some of the 
leaflets she was identified as the author. However, others were addressed from 
‘Concerned Parents and Tax Payers’. She continued to distribute these particular 
leaflets despite being warned that they contravened section 3599.09 (A) of the Ohio 
State Code, pursuant to which, authors were not permitted to write, print or disseminate 
campaigning literature without providing their name and address. Consequently, 
McIntyre was fined, a decision upheld by the Ohio State Supreme Court. As in Author 
of a Blog, the ‘speech’ in McIntyre was political in nature,59 as it engaged a State 
provision related specifically to ‘campaign literature’. It is submitted that the 
fundamental basis of the State Supreme Court’s judgment, founded on audience 
interests, is similar to Eady J’s reasoning in Author of a Blog, in which it was held that 
the blogger’s anonymity impaired the operation of the public interest as his identity was 
required to better enable the audience to determine his veracity.60  According to the 
State Supreme Court the burden placed on an author of campaign literature to identify 
themselves is ‘more than counterbalanced’ by the public interest in ‘providing the 
audience to whom the message is directed with a mechanism by which they may better 
evaluate its validity’ and enables the identification of authors publishing fraudulent and 
defamatory communications.61 Eventually, the case was heard by the US Supreme 
Court. 62 Stevens J, giving the judgment of the Court, stated: ‘an author’s decision to 
remain anonymous…is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment’.63 As a result of this seminal ruling, which has been followed in a number 
																																																								
58 514 US 334 (1995). 
59 [2009] EMLR 22, [24]. 
60 ibid. [21]-[23]. 
61 618 NE 2d 152 (1993). The State Supreme Court relied on the case of First National Bank of Boston 
v Bellotti 435 US 765 (1978) in which it was held that not only are such interests sufficient to overcome 
the minor burden placed on individuals to disclose their identity in this context, but that these interests 
and pursuant regulations would survive constitutional scrutiny. 
62 514 US 334 (1995). 
63 ibid. at 342. Ginsburg J and Thomas J gave separate concurring judgments. Thomas J gave an account 
of anonymous political writing in the US in the eighteenth century. From this examination he inferred 
that the Founding Fathers of the Constitution intended anonymous speech to be covered by the First 
Amendment: ibid. 359-371. 
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of subsequent cases,64 enshrined within the First Amendment is an absolute free speech 
right to communicate anonymously or pseudonymously.65  
 
 Two strands emerge from Stevens J’s judgment to justify the anonymity right.66 
The first is paradigmatic of the argument from democratic self-governance, as 
supported by the argument from self-fulfillment and, as is advanced at section 3 below, 
goes to a speaker’s interest in anonymous expression. It advances a libertarian 
argument that ‘[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority’ 67  and, 
according to Barendt, enables ‘radicals and dissenters to express unpopular views free 
from the fear of retaliation or prosecution.’68 This instrumental argument is clearly 
aligned to free speech rationale arguments in Author of a Blog,69 and the speaker 
interest-orientated reasons given by the Federal Supreme Court in the Spickmich case. 
Similarly, in an earlier decision, the Supreme Court, in Talley v California,70 recognised 
‘a tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes’71 accordingly, in the 
absence of anonymity, valuable political speech may not be published.72 The second 
strand is rights-based. According to Stevens J ‘the identity of the speaker is no different 
from other components of the document’s content that the author is free to include or 
exclude’.73 Thus, an author is free to determine the contents of their publication, and 
they are entitled to write anonymously or pseudonymously. As a rejoinder to the 
contention that an audience may have a real interest in knowing the identity of the 
author to assess their credibility and the strength of their views, Stevens J employed the 
argument that to compel an individual to disclose their name (or any other identifying 
																																																								
64 As Barendt observes, although the decision has been distinguished in cases relating to litigation 
concerning the disclosure of election expenditure, its ‘fundamental correctness’ has rarely been 
questioned within US jurisprudence. Barendt above n 1, 56 and ch.7.  
65 For example, see: Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 515 US 557 
(1995); Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation 525 US 182 (1999); Watchtower Bible and 
Tract Society of New York v Stratton 536 US 150 (2002); ACLU of Nevada v Heller 378 F3d 979 (2004).  
66 L. Lidsky and T. Cotter, ‘Authorship, Audiences and Anonymous Speech’ (2006) 82 Notre Dame Law 
Review 1537, 1542-1544, 
67 McIntyre 514 US 334 (1995), 357. 
68 Barendt above n 1, 58. 
69 [2009] EMLR 22, [4] and [18]. 
70 362 US 60 (1960). 
71 McIntyre 514 US 334 (1995), 343. 
72 Barendt above n 1, 58. 
73 McIntyre 514 US 334 (1995), 348. 
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details) is equivalent to requiring them to express a particular opinion. 74 This argument 
is considered in more detail in section 3 below. 
 
The McIntyre decision has been followed in the context of online 
communications75 and, therefore, by extension, would apply to social media speech. In 
ACLU v Zell Miller76 a federal District Court held that a Georgia statute making it an 
offence to transmit messages over the Internet using a false name was invalid, as it 
contravened the First Amendment. In the same year, in Reno v American Civil Liberties 
Union77, the US Supreme Court, in determining that there was no basis for qualifying 
the protection afforded by the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech in the 
context of the Internet, rejected the argument that the Internet could be subject to similar 
special content regulation that had traditionally been applied to, and had constrained, 
broadcast media. In particular, the Court stated that although some of its earlier cases 
had recognised special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media, these are 
not, necessarily, applicable to other speakers.78 It was of the opinion that the factors it 
had relied upon in relation to the broadcast media79 ‘are not present in cyberspace’.80 
Eady J’s judgment in Author of a Blog was based exclusively on audience interests. To 
the contrary, this decision was based entirely on the interests of the speaker. Both cases 
are considered again in section 3, which looks at the problems that are symptomatic of 
relying purely on one interest. Thus, the right to communicate anonymously, both 
online and offline, has now been accepted as an integral part of the First Amendment.  
 
																																																								
74 ibid. 348-349. Consequently, the Supreme Court rejected the Ohio State’s argument that the disclosure 
requirement was justified as it provided the audience with more information.  
75 However, the right to communicate anonymously on the Internet is not absolute. For example, pursuant 
to Federal statute it is an offence to use a telecommunications device, without the user disclosing their 
identity, with intent to abuse, threaten or harass any specific individual. See: 47 US Code section 
223(a)(1)(c); D.K. Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard University Press, 2014), 124-125. 
According to Barendt this law would, almost certainly, survive constitutional challenge, as true threats, 
instilling a real fear of violence are not protected by the First Amendment: Barendt above n 1, 126; 
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette Inc. v American Coalition of Life Activists 290 F3d 
1058 (9th Cir, 2002). 
76 977 F Supp 1228 (ND, GA 1997). 
77 521 US 844 (1997). 
78 ibid. 868-870. For instance, in Red Lion Broadcasting Company v FCC 395 US 367 (1969), 399-400 
and FCC v Pacifica Foundation 438 US 726 (1978) the Court relied on the history of extensive 
government regulation of the broadcast media. Other factors included (i) the scarcity of available 
frequencies at its inception: Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. v FCC 512 US 622 (1994), 637-638; (ii) 
its ‘invasive’ nature: Sable Communications of California Inc. v FCC 492 US 115 (1989), 128. 
79 ibid. 868-869. 
80 ibid. 869 
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This section has established that, at present, anonymous and pseudonymous 
online expression is faced with two opposing schools of thought. In England, freedom 
of expression provides a level of protection for such speech. Whereas the US (and to a 
lesser extent, Germany) clearly recognises a constitutional right for these types of 
communication. What is apparent from the Strasbourg case law is that protection 
afforded for anonymous and pseudonymous expression, at the moment at least, falls 
short of a clearly recognised right and, consequently, seems to sit, rather opaquely, 
somewhere between the two sides. However, based on the explicit importance placed 
upon anonymous and pseudonymous speech by the ECtHR in Delfi and by Council of 
Europe provisions, there seems to be potential for the establishment of such a right. 
These schools of thought are based on opposing interests: those of the speaker and the 
audience.  The following section will consider these rights, and how they apply to 
anonymous and pseudonymous speech communicated via social media and online. 
 
3. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ONLINE ANONYMITY - SPEAKER VERSUS 
AUDIENCE INTERESTS: AN OBSOLETE DISTINCTION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH? 
 
The speaker versus audience interests dichotomy has consistently been the subject of 
arguments relating to free speech generally.81 Within these arguments there has been a 
clear delineation between these ‘competing’ interests. The case law explored above 
demonstrates that, on the one hand, speaker interests in free speech (and privacy) have 
been used to support a right to anonymous expression, whereas, on the other hand, 
audience interests have tended to have been employed to argue for the author’s identity 
to be known or, at the very most, for a limited level of protection for anonymous 
speech. 82  This section will discuss the problems associated with the exclusive 
application of each interest as a basis for free speech, particularly within the context of 
anonymous and pseudonymous online and social media communication, as has hitherto 
																																																								
81 For example, see: T. Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ (1972) 1 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 204; R. Dworkin, ‘Introduction’ in The Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 1977), 15; 
F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 105-106, 158-
160; L. Alexander, Is There a Right to Freedom of Expression? (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8-
9; S. Kreimer, ‘Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letter: The Tension between Privacy and Disclosure in 
Constitutional Law’ (1991) 140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 85-86; R. Post, ‘The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 603, 639-640. 
82 See Delfi AS v Estonia [2015] EMLR 26 above. 
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been the practice in England, the US and Europe. It will advance the argument that 
applying either interest exclusively to online and social media expression is 
problematic, for the following reasons: A US-type right to anonymous speech, based 
on speakers’ interests, goes too far. It does not adequately protect other countervailing 
rights and, inadvertently, protects speakers who disseminate harmful and damaging 
speech. However, the English and ECtHR positions that, at best, provide limited 
protection for anonymous speech, based on audience interests, do not go far enough in 
protecting certain groups who, for instance, may use social media as a method to 
disseminate information of constitutional value.83  
 
3.1 Conflicting or complementary interests? Striking a balance between the 
speaker and the audience 
 
As already discussed, the Supreme Court’s decision in McIntyre is based on the right 
of the speaker to determine the contents of their speech. According to the Court, this 
speaker interest took precedence over the audience’s right to information regarding the 
speaker’s identity, in order for the reader to be able to properly assess the credibility of 
the author’s publication. In its judgment the Supreme Court approved a New York 
court’s decision in New York v Duryea84 that, when it comes to anonymous sources, the 
public is able to determine the value of speech,85 as compared to communications from 
an identified speaker: 
 
‘Don’t underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to 
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. 
They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with 
its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read the 
message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide what is 
‘responsible’, what is valuable, and what is truth.’ 
 
																																																								
83 See: P. Coe, ‘Redefining 'media' using a 'media-as-a-constitutional-component' concept: An evaluation 
of the need for the European Court of Human Rights to alter its understanding of 'media' within a new 
media landscape’, Legal Studies (2017) Vol. 37, No. 1, 25-53. 
84 351 NYS 2d 978, 995 (1974); McIntyre 514 US 334 (1995), 348, n 11. 
85 Indeed, Post argues that speech should be assessed entirely divorced from the context in which it is 
made, including the origin of the communication: Post above n 81, 639-640. 
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The decisions that followed, in cases such as Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston,86 Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation,87 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v Stratton,88ACLU of Nevada v 
Heller89 and, in the context of online communication, ACLU and Reno,90 were similarly 
based on speaker interests to support anonymous and pseudonymous expression. The 
interests of the speaker were also the dominant interests in the German Federal 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Spickmich. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reno highlights some of the issues surrounding 
online and social media speech generally and, in particular, anonymous speech 
conveyed via these mediums. Thus, the efficacy of the judgment, based purely on 
speaker interests, if applied to a modern context, is questionable. Like Author of a Blog, 
it highlights problems symptomatic of applying one interest exclusively. The Court was 
of the opinion that ‘…the Internet is not as invasive as radio or television.’91  In coming 
to this decision, the Court relied upon the finding of the District Court that:  
 
‘Communications over the Internet do not invade an individual’s home or 
appear on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter 
content by accident…[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded by 
warnings as to the content…odds are slim that a user would come across a 
sexually explicit sight by accident.’92  
 
This decision is indicative of the pace at which online and social media 
communication has developed, as the findings upon which the decision is based are 
arguably at odds with current online expression. Internet communications, in particular 
those transmitted via social media, can be invasive. To an extent this may be ‘allowed’ 
by the user of the social media platform, by virtue of registering with the platform and 
joining particular communities. However, users are still subject to ‘unbidden’ messages 
																																																								
86 515 US 557 (1995). 
87 525 US 182 (1999). 
88 536 US 150 (2002). 
89 378 F3d 979 (2004). 
90 See section 2.1.1 above. 
91 ibid.  
92 929 F. Supp, 844 (finding 88). 
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regularly appearing on their mobile telephone, tablet and laptop screens.93 Further, the 
availability of sexually explicit content has been proliferated by social media, and is 
synonymous with platforms such as WhatsApp and Snapchat, as demonstrated by the 
‘revenge porn’ phenomenon.94 ‘Unbidden’ messages and content of a sexually explicit 
nature are, very often, anonymous or pseudonymous, meaning that there exists a lack 
of accountability which can seriously impact upon an individual’s ability to seek 
recourse, for instance in relation to damage caused to their reputation by virtue of libel 
proceedings (this is discussed in more detail below).95  
 
Contrary to judgments based purely on speaker interests, Kreimer suggests that, 
in many situations, anonymous or pseudonymous expression is not appropriate, as it is 
important for the audience to be able to identify the speaker. Knowing the origin of the 
speech enables the audience to attribute a value and assess the veracity of their previous 
communications, as they will be publicly accessible. Therefore, this allows them to 
evaluate their prior experience.96 This view is animated by Eady J’s judgment in Author 
of a Blog97 in which he upheld The Times’ argument that the public was entitled to 
know the identity of the author of the blog to assess the strength of his criticisms of the 
police force in which he was serving.98 Accordingly, Schauer and Alexander are of the 
opinion that free speech is predominantly concerned with audience interests. They 
believe that speakers enjoy only derivative rights, which are subject to protection only 
to ensure that the interests of the audience are safeguarded.99  Some social media 
platforms have adopted this stance in respect of their anonymity and pseudonymity 
policies. Facebook, for example, at least ‘officially’, does not allow registration under 
a pseudonym.100 The platform believes that users are more responsible in debate and 
social commentary when they use the site under their real name.101 Similarly, between 
2011 and 2014 Google+ required users to register under their ‘common name’ (the 
																																																								
93 For detailed analysis of how the economic constructs of social media has influenced this issue see: J. 
Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity (Oxford University Press, 2013), 163-176. 
94 Coe above n 17, 28-29; See generally: B. Leiter, ‘Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech’ 
in S. Levmore and M. Nussbaum (eds), The Offensive Internet (Harvard University Press, 2010).  
95 ibid. (Leiter); S. Levmore above n 1. 
96 Kreimer above n 81, 85-86. 
97 [2009] EMLR 22. See section 2.1 for the facts of the case. 
98 ibid. [21]. 
99 Schauer above n 81, 105-106; Alexander above n 72, 8-9. 
100 R. MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked (Basic Books, 2012), 150. 
101 Facebook Guidelines of March 2015 for the removal of hate content. 
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name by which they were known to family, friends and colleagues). It used an algorithm 
to detect likely pseudonyms, and automatically suspend these accounts, even when 
these users were generally known by a pseudonym or nickname. Google said that it 
introduced the policy to promote the safe use of the Internet, and to prevent the 
dissemination of anonymous spam.102 The views of Kreimer, Schauer and Alexander, 
Eady J’s judgment, and Facebook’s policy, correlate with Barendt’s argument that the 
case for freedom of speech dictates that, when it comes to general political and 
economic discourse, the public should know something about the credentials of the 
speaker. Equally, an audience wants to know the identity of the speaker to enable it to 
evaluate the worth of the publication.103  
 
It is submitted that these views, the decision in Author of a Blog, and Facebook’s 
policy are problematic, particularly in the context of anonymous and pseudonymous 
online and social media expression, for the following reasons. Firstly, they do not take 
into account the use of pseudonyms. If the audience is unaware that the speaker is 
communicating under a pseudonym they may not adjust the value they attribute to that 
respective communication.104 Secondly, knowing the speaker’s true identity does not, 
necessarily, add any value. Just because one can see the name of the speaker or author 
does not mean they can assess their credibility. This observation is particularly pertinent 
in respect of citizen journalism. These journalists, who may well be disseminating 
information of real constitutional value, may not have a ‘background’ to assess that is 
accessible to the public. In these circumstances, they may as well be acting under a 
pseudonym, as their real identity does not provide any usable information for the 
audience to evaluate. Equally, the traditional media increasingly rely on citizen 
journalists as a source of news. Consequently, speech is ‘recycled’ through traditional 
forms of media that may come from speakers that are identified, but unknown, or from 
anonymous sources, or from speakers operating under a pseudonym. Thirdly (and 
directly linked to the points above) Facebook’s anonymity and pseudonymity policy 
relies on users to report fellow users using pseudonyms. In many instances, it is likely 
that these users will have no idea that a pseudonym is being used. Notwithstanding this, 
																																																								
102 L. Papworth, Social Network Identity: Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Accountability, Media 140, 
10th November 2011. 
103 Barendt above n 1, 66-67. 
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from a practical perspective, it is almost impossible for platforms such as Facebook to 
monitor and vet the millions of messages carried each week.105 Furthermore, it also 
conflicts with the advice given to police officers to use a pseudonym on social media 
to protect their identity. Many police officers do use pseudonyms for this purpose on 
Facebook, among other social media platforms. For the same reason, the General 
Medical Council supports the right of doctors to use social media anonymously or 
pseudonymously. 106  Incidentally, Facebook’s real name policy has been held to 
infringe German data protection law.107  Finally, the problems that could potentially 
flow from the decision in Author of a Blog are, like Reno, in respect of speaker interests, 
symptomatic of applying audience interests exclusively. These judgments illustrate the 
need for a balance to be struck between both interests. There is currently an abundance 
of blogs, similar to ‘Night Jack’, that disseminate information of constitutional value.108 
Because the decision required the author to identify himself it surely has the propensity 
to dissuade other people (and whistleblowers) from communicating in a similar way.  
 
This judgment also illustrates a challenge faced by citizen journalists. 109 
Because, in most circumstances, these journalists are not considered ‘media’, they are 
not subject to the enhanced right to media freedom. As a result, they cannot avail 
themselves of a journalist’s immunity from being required to disclose sources of 
information. If the author of the blog would have taken his ‘story’ to The Times, rather 
than publish it on his blog, the newspaper may have published it, and then refused to 
identify its source because it, as a recognised media entity, would not have had to 
disclose its source pursuant to the right to media freedom. In doing so, it would have 
argued that the public interest in the story took precedent over any interest the police 
force had in identifying the whistleblower. The judgment, based exclusively on 
audience interests, seems to favour the traditional media, in that, by virtue of the right 
to media freedom, it is immune from disclosing its sources, yet it is also able to identify 
																																																								
105 Levmore above n 1, 59. 
106 Barendt above n 1, 135. 
107 Specifically, section 13, VI of the Telemedia Act 2007 and section 3a Data Protection Act 2003. The 
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a respected citizen journalist who independently publishes a story for which it could 
claim journalists’ privilege.110   
 
Taking this argument a step further, as well as bestowing certain privileges on 
the media, the right to media freedom carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
including transparency.111  The journalistic media is subject to a right of reply.112 
Therefore, at least within a European context, the media has to make available certain 
information about the publisher or editor. 113 As Oster states, ‘[w]hile anonymity is part 
of freedom of expression, responsible journalism requires that at least the editor of the 
publication be immediately identifiable in order to facilitate effective protection against 
defamation and privacy violation.’114 This duty runs counter to a culture of anonymity 
and pseudonymity prevalent on the Internet and social media, and very often practised 
by citizen journalists. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that a blogger, such as Night Jack, 
is not considered media, and therefore not subject to media freedom, even if they were, 
the fact that that they are the ‘source’, ‘author’ and ‘publisher’ would mean that they 
would not be fulfilling their journalistic responsibilities pursuant to the right if they 
published anonymously or under a pseudonym. Whereas, to the contrary, a journalist 
for The Times could use their editor or publishing company of the newspaper to ‘shield’ 
their identity. Herein lies a significant challenge for citizen journalists: what is relevant 
to the concept of responsible journalism is that a person, whether that be the journalist 
or their editor, or an organisation, such as the publishing company, claims responsibility 
for a publication, and can, as a result, be held liable. For example, it is the policy of The 
Economist to publish all of its articles anonymously. However, it is clear that The 
Economist Newspaper Ltd is responsible for its articles, and can, therefore, be held 
liable for them. Consequently, both the The Economist, and its journalists, in respect of 
this at least, comply with their journalistic responsibilities. To the contrary, because of 
the nature of citizen journalism, in particular the fact that many bloggers operate alone 
as both the author and the publisher, means they do not have the ‘shield’ of an 
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identifiable editor or organisation that could be held liable. If they did, this would defeat 
the very purpose of their anonymity or pseudonym. However, by not providing the 
details of an identifiable person or organisation they are not conforming to the concept 
of responsible journalism. Ultimately, this challenge faced by citizen journalists could 
undermine the value of such journalism and, paradoxically, damage audience interests, 
as less people will engage with it, which will, in turn, hinder democratic participation 
and self-fulfillment. 
 
 Barendt suggests that the rights and interests of speakers, distinct from those of 
the audience are ‘emphasised’ by the argument from self-fulfillment, in that ‘speech is 
an essential aspect of the right to self-development and fulfillment, or of individual 
autonomy, and so must be respected as an aspect of that autonomy.’115 Baker takes this 
further. He argues that the right to freedom of expression should take precedence over 
countervailing rights because it facilitates autonomy – by allowing individuals to 
exercise self-expression or self-disclosure they control whether or not to reveal 
themselves to others and, therefore, enables the respective individual to be treated as 
autonomous.116 According to Barendt this argument is problematic. He suggests that 
the argument from self-fulfillment is the ‘least plausible rationale’ for freedom of 
speech and that it would be ‘odd’ to base the right to free speech on the speaker’s 
interest in self-development or fulfillment. Specifically, he states: ‘[h]ow does the mask 
of anonymity claimed by someone who prefers to remain nameless or to publish under 
the disguise of a pseudonym advance that person’s self-development as an 
individual?’117 It is submitted that the position adopted by Barendt is flawed, in respect 
of anonymous and pseudonymous expression conveyed by both the traditional media 
and, in particular, online and via social media, for the reasons discussed below.  
 
In Reno District Judge Dalzell stated that the Internet is ‘the most participatory 
form of mass speech yet developed’.118 Social media platforms, blogs, email and chat 
rooms are a way of not only receiving information, but of transmitting views on any 
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116 C.E. Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 1989), ch. 3; C.E. 
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topic instantaneously; they have facilitated a convergence of audience and producer.119  
Thus, anonymity and pseudonymity is a culturally inherent aspect of online and social 
media communication.120 According to Suler the ability to communicate anonymously 
is a principal factor for online disinhibition effect, whereby people are less inhibited to 
say things online, which they would not say in a ‘real life’ encounter. It allows them to 
hide their identity and to operate under the assumption, at least, that their real identities 
cannot be linked to messages they send, and so they cannot be held responsible for the 
consequences of that expression.121 In this context the ‘mask’ of anonymity or the 
‘disguise’ of a pseudonym can advance a person’s self-development as it gives them a 
voice in circumstances where, without anonymity or pseudonymity, they would not be 
able to express themselves. A pertinent example is academic speech. One only has to 
look at Times Higher Education to see regular instances of academics writing 
anonymously about controversial issues within their University, or Higher Education 
generally. Of even greater significance is academic speech in countries where 
academics fear persecution for expressing views.122 In both of these examples, arguably 
academics are developing intellectually.  In these type of situations where they could 
not, or would not want, to reveal their identity through fear of persecution or reprisals, 
by virtue of being able to express themselves anonymously or under a pseudonym, they 
are able to engage in dialogue with other academics and/or the process of research, 
writing and, ultimately, the peer review of their work (which tends to be conducted 
anonymously in any event123). Of course, the rejoinder to this argument is that such 
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disinhibition, by virtue of anonymity and pseudonymity, can potentially act as a catalyst 
for irresponsible and unacceptable behaviour in online and social media forums (this is 
discussed in greater depth below). 
 
It has been argued that Mill’s argument from truth, and the argument from 
democratic self-governance are, predominantly, associated with audience interests.124 
Indeed, in relation to the argument from democratic self-governance, and in the context 
of the regulation of speech at public meetings, Meiklejohn was of the opinion that it is 
important that ‘not every one shall get to speak, but that everything worth saying shall 
be said’.125 However, in McIntyre the Supreme Court justified the existence of a right 
to anonymous and pseudonymous expression as a protection against the tyranny of the 
majority.126 Consequently, an additional argument to support a right to anonymity 
based on speaker interests is that without such a right speakers would not participate at 
all in political discourse. According to scholars such as Dworkin, Post and Redish, such 
a right is incorporated within a speaker’s right to contribute to public life.127 It is 
submitted that the argument from democratic self-governance, and the argument from 
self-fulfillment, do not operate exclusively from each other as justifications for 
anonymous and pseudonymous speech. To the contrary, self-fulfillment is an integral 
and supportive aspect of an individual’s ability to participate in democratic discourse.  
The argument from democratic self-governance, as supported by the argument from 
self-fulfillment, is particularly pertinent to online and social media communication, as 
it supports the primary rationale for a right to anonymous speech within these arenas; 
anonymous expression enables more people to engage in public discourse and, in so 
doing, contribute valuable information and ideas to society than would be the case if 
their speech were inhibited by a requirement to disclose their identity. Indeed, David 
Kaye, the UN Rapporteur on the promotion of freedom of expression has robustly 
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supported a right to communicate anonymously online. Kaye’s support of anonymous 
communication on the Internet is indicative of a combination of the arguments 
advanced above in that, in authoritarian countries there will be universal reluctance to 
speak freely and contribute to public and political discourse, both online and offline, 
for fear of persecution.128 As Barendt states: ‘[a]nonymity enables the circumvention 
of the myriad restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression imposed by 
authoritarian governments.’129 It can also facilitate democratic participation in liberal 
societies more tolerant of political dissent.130 In fact, the example of academic speech 
in relation to self-fulfillment given above is equally applicable to this point. Anonymity 
is essential for individuals wishing to express views that may expose them to 
disciplinary action or dismissal by their employer, or ostracism from colleagues.131 
These are the very reasons why Eady J’s judgment in Author of a Blog, based 
exclusively on audience interests, is so fundamentally flawed. Paradoxically, rather 
than protecting the audience, by potentially dissuading individuals from participating 
in citizen journalism, it damages audience interests, as less people are exposed to 
information that may have a constitutional value. This can limit their engagement with 
democratic discourse and hinder their self-fulfillment. Equally, according to Stein, 
protection of anonymous and pseudonymous speech, particularly in ‘cyberspace’, 
‘provides a context’ for lesbians and gay men ‘in which to speak freely, without 
identifying themselves, and without having to be physically present to communicate 
with others.’132 This can be extended to vulnerable groups, such as asylum-seekers, 
immigrants and the mentally and physically disabled, amongst others, in that, for the 
same reasons, anonymity and pseudonymity enables them to exercise their freedom of 
speech and, therefore, not only develop intellectually, but also participate in, and 
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contribute to, public discourse.133 However, there is a robust rejoinder to this argument. 
Thomas Scanlon’s individual autonomy concept, which is based on the right of the 
audience to receive information, be exposed to every type of argument and to be free 
from governmental intrusion into the process of individual decision-making, 134  is 
equally applicable, as access to minority views, that may not be available without 
anonymous or pseudonymous communication, are an essential aspect of audience 
rights.  
	
Thus, where social media and online communication are concerned, speakers 
have a particularly strong claim to the right to freedom of expression 135  and, by 
extension, the right to communicate anonymously or pseudonymously. This is because 
the convergence of audience and producer, which has been created by social media and 
online expression has, in turn, given rise to the ascendance of citizen journalism. 
Consequently, free speech is facilitated by the fact that these speakers are not subject 
to, for instance, political bias, censorship, the influence of media ownership and 
editorial control, at least to the same extent as they would be within the context of the 
mass media,136 where greater emphasis is usually placed on the interest of the audience 
who, to assess the reliability of the journalist or broadcaster, are concerned with being 
apprised of that individual’s identity.137 Ekstrand argues that those who communicate 
online and, by extension, via social media, are more likely to tolerate anonymity,138 
either because it is generally accepted that anonymous and pseudonymous 
communication is ‘normal’ in these arenas139 or because their expectations are lower as 
to the reliability of the information provided or the expertise of those responsible for 
disseminating the information. To the contrary, Citron suggests that certain aspects of 
the Internet may make online communication potentially more damaging than 
information disseminated offline.140 There is no doubt this can be extended to social 
media. A consequence of the way in which social media and online communication has 
become ingrained within our social cultural fabric, is that habits, conventions and social 
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norms, that were once informal manifestations of social life, are now infused within 
these methods of communication. What were casual and ephemeral actions and/or acts 
of expression, such as conversing with friends or colleagues or swapping/displaying 
pictures, or exchanging thoughts that were once kept private or maybe shared with a 
select few, have now become formalised and permanent. These actions and expressions 
are, in the click of mouse, or the flick of a finger, publicised for the world to see. Thus, 
unlike broadcasts or newsprint, that are perceived to be more transitory in nature, and 
are ‘tomorrow’s fish and chips’ paper’, 141  online communication lends itself to 
permanency;142 it enters the ‘public domain, with the potential for long-lasting and far 
reaching-consequences’.143 Search engines, such as Google, provide users with links to 
harmful communications. These can remain accessible to the public, sometimes for 
very long periods of time, and certainly longer than with the traditional media, after 
they were initially published.144 This can have negative and long lasting effects on 
individuals’ lives. For instance, research carried out by the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel found that two out of five employers look at candidates’ online activity or 
social media profiles to inform their recruitment decisions.145 Realistically, this is likely 
to be even higher, as many employers do not ‘officially’ screen applicants. 
The fact that information disseminated online and via social media can, 
potentially, remain available permanently, and is easily accessible by anybody, gives 
rise to three further issues, which are amplified by anonymous and pseudonymous 
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expression: (i) the absence of ‘responsible’ intermediaries, which is conducive to (ii) 
the proliferation of fake news and (iii) the fact that victims of, for instance, cyber-
bullying, hate crime and defamation are not able to identify the origin of the 
communication. Consequently, these harms form the foundation for a strong audience 
interest-based argument against a right to anonymous and pseudonymous speech; they 
provide support for the restriction of anonymous and pseudonymous speech in an online 
or social media context. This argument, considered through the lens of these harms, 
informs the remainder of this section.  
In The Offensive Internet, Levmore points to the distinction between the 
traditional media and, in particular, social media.146 He states that, with the traditional 
media (including the press, broadcasting and book and journal publishing), the danger 
posed by anonymity is mitigated by the presence of an active intermediary.147 In these 
contexts the journalist, editor or publisher can vouch for the integrity and reliability of 
their source, author or speaker. They can also check the story prior to publication or 
broadcast and, if need be, refer it to their legal team to prevent the dissemination of any 
material that may present disproportionate legal risks.  To the contrary, it is unusual for 
online intermediaries to assume this responsibility for two reasons. Firstly, there has 
been a disinclination amongst social media companies to play the role of arbiter, as this 
leaves them open to claims of censorship.148 This stance is clearly based on speaker 
interests. Secondly, due to the volume of online and social media communications, 
monitoring content is extremely difficult for social media platforms and website 
operators. 149  For Internet Service Providers (ISPs) acting as conduits for the 
transmission of messages, monitoring such content is impossible.150 These reasons pose 
a significant challenge for these mediums that have, traditionally, supported the interest 
of the speaker.151 They are under increasing pressure to be able to identify authors of, 
for instance, defamatory material, revenge porn, cyber-bullying, hate speech and 
communications inciting terrorism to enable successful civil actions and/or criminal 
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prosecutions.152  This issue is animated by the recent ‘fake news’ phenomenon.153 
Social media platforms are being asked to deal with the proliferation of fake news on 
their sites.154 Facebook, in particular, has been the subject of strong criticism in the 
wake of the 2016 US election.155 This led to the platform introducing audience interest 
based measures to deal with the issue of fake news (it announced that it will be 
partnering with a third-party fact-checking organisation) whilst, at the same time, 
reiterating its speaker interest based commitment to ‘giving people a voice’ and that it 
‘cannot become an arbiter of truth’,156 with Mark Zuckerberg stating: 
‘We believe in giving people a voice, which means erring on the side of 
letting people share what they want whenever possible. We need to be 
careful not to discourage sharing of opinions or to mistakenly restrict 
accurate content.’157 
It is submitted that pressure to act as intermediaries that censor material may deter 
social media platforms, website operators and ISPs from providing their service and/or 
encourage them to act as arbiters of truth. This, in turn, could have a chilling effect on 
freedom of expression. The criticism leveled at social media platforms in respect of 
their reluctance to act as proactive intermediaries in the context of fake news, and the 
consequential response of the sites, are indicative of the challenges that emanate from 
the apparent conflict between the perceived roles of these platforms, and whether they 
should be required to operate as media or as technology companies.158 It also clearly 
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demonstrates that basing social media expression exclusively on one or other right is 
not appropriate. Instead, a combination of the two is required to provide an enhanced 
level of protection for anonymous and pseudonymous expression.  
 In contrast to social media platforms such as Facebook, that have adopted real 
name policies, 159  some sites have implemented policies that enable their users to 
communicate under a pseudonym or anonymously. Examples include sites such as 
Social Number, Gaia Online, Evsum and Anonyming.160 According to Bartlett and 
Citron, a particularly notorious site is 4chan, which has become synonymous with 
trolling, the dissemination of pornographic material, Internet attacks and threats of 
violence. 161  Herein lies the problem with online expression communicated 
anonymously or pseudonymously; it can prevent, or at least make it very difficult, for 
a victim of cyber-bullying, revenge porn, hate speech or defamation to identify the 
origin of the speech. The fact that they are unaware of the perpetrator, and their 
proximity to them, can make the harm suffered more acute.162 This is illustrated by a 
number of cases from different jurisdictions. In 2007, several pseudonymous posts 
sexually abusing and threatening named female law students at Yale University were 
disseminated by the US social media site AutoAdmit.163 The victims were successful 
in obtaining a court order requiring the platform to identify the perpetrators.164 The 
Latvian-based social media site Ask-fm has been linked to anonymous cyber-bullying 
for a number of years.165 In 2013 bullying on the site allegedly led to the suicide of 
Hannah Smith, a 14-year-old from Leicestershire, UK.166 The Canadian newspaper, 
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The Globe and Mail, reported in 2016 that at least seven teen suicides, from countries 
around the world, are the result of anonymous cyber-bullying emanating from the 
site.167 Also in 2013, Reece Elliot of South Shields, UK used a pseudonym to threaten 
to kill two hundred students at a school in the US State of Tennessee on a memorial 
Facebook page for a fellow student killed in a car crash. The threats caused thousands 
of students to stay away from the school. Consequently, Elliot was convicted of sending 
‘grossly offensive’ and ‘menacing’ messages contrary to section 127 of the 
Communications Act 2003. 168 In the same year, in the UK, Isabella Sorley and John 
Nimmo used Twitter to anonymously tweet threats of violence, including rape, to 
Caroline Criado-Perez for campaigning for a woman to appear on Bank of England 
notes, and to Stella Creasy MP for supporting Criado-Perez’s campaign. According to 
Judge Riddle the tweets’ anonymity heightened the victims’ fear, as they had no way 
of knowing the danger posed by perpetrators, or how to recognise and avoid them.169 
Like Elliot, they were convicted of the section 127 offence.   
 The absence of proactive intermediaries, the ubiquity of fake news and, as 
illustrated by the examples above, the fact that victims of, for example, cyber-bullying 
and defamation are unable to easily identify the origins of the offending communication 
reinforce Levmore’s contention that anonymous online communication has made it ‘the 
preferred medium for juvenile communications’.170 They also support the argument 
that a constitutionally protected US-style speaker interest based absolute right to 
anonymous and pseudonymous speech could be claimed by anybody, including those 
disseminating fake news, or engaging in cyber-bullying, revenge porn, hate crimes, 
harassment or defamation. However, despite this, it is non-sequitur that an audience 
interest based argument that social media platforms, website operators and ISPs should 
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require users to identify themselves, prevails (as has happened in authoritarian countries 
such as China171).  
4. CONCLUSION 
This article has established the benefits of anonymous and pseudonymous expression, 
particularly online and via social media: it facilitates free speech by enabling more 
people to communicate and exchange ideas and information. As a result, it fuels greater 
participation in public discourse and facilitates self-fulfillment. If this type of speech is 
restricted or prohibited, based on an audience interest approach, then these tangible 
advantages will be lost. Consequently, as advanced in relation to Author of a Blog this, 
paradoxically, can damage the interests of the audience as it may dissuade people from 
engaging with this form of media and contributing to valuable citizen journalism that, 
in turn, could limit the amount of people able to participate in democratic discourse. 
Furthermore, the benefits gained by the audience from requiring speakers to identify 
themselves, particularly in respect of online and social media expression, is 
questionable; it does not, necessarily, enable the audience to accurately assess the 
credentials of the speaker and, therefore, the value of the communication. However, 
free speech based entirely on speaker interests and, in particular, the existence of a US-
style constitutionally protected right to communicate anonymously and 
pseudonymously is equally as problematic, as it inadvertently protects speakers 
engaging in unwanted and damaging speech. 
How lawyers, judges and speakers and audiences in all contexts of speech 
proceed is not an easy question to answer, and requires more research and debate. 
Ultimately, however, what this article has ascertained is that a balance needs to be 
struck between the competing speaker and audience interests. For the reasons outlined 
above, and in the prevailing sections, anonymous and pseudonymous expression should 
be allowed to continue, albeit not without qualification. For instance, in the context of 
online expression, upon being notified by the victims of harmful and damaging speech, 
or by the authorities, social media platforms, website operators and ISPs should 
immediately suspend the offending perpetrator’s account. They should also assist the 
authorities and the victims of crimes or defamatory allegations by identifying the 
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perpetrators of the harmful speech for the purpose of legal proceedings. As Citron 
advocates, users who have previously been allowed to communicate anonymously or 
under a pseudonym, but who have abused that privilege, by engaging in, for instance, 
hate speech or cyber-bullying, should be prevented from doing so in the future by being 
required to use their real name.172  
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